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Alert 189 – South Africa seeks to salvage US relations ahead of impending review
South Africa’s efforts to improve relations with the United States (US) appear to be making progress following the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) Forum in Washington DC on 24 to 26 July. Trade, Industry, and Competition Minister Parks Tau used his post-forum press briefing to state that South Africa was not at risk of being excluded from the AGOA programme.
This will be a major relief to South African exporters which benefit from the US’s Africa-focused beneficial trade programme. South Africa exports around R60 billion worth of goods every year to the US under the AGOA programme with job-creating industries such as agriculture and automotive manufacturing among the leading beneficiaries. As such, South Africa’s private sector operators were alarmed when the US House of Representatives passed a Bill in June ordering the US government to conduct a full review of its relationship with South Africa.
This review will assess whether South Africa’s international relations undermine US national security interests. Ostensibly this review was called for in response to South Africa’s close relations with US rivals such as China, Russia, and Iran. These ties have long been a source of tension in US-South Africa relations but came to a head in May 2023 when US Ambassador to South Africa made unsubstantiated allegations that South Africa was supplying arms to Russia to use in its war on Ukraine.
Antipathy to South Africa within the US legislature is also driven by South Africa’s decision in December 2023 to lodge a case of genocide against Israel before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over Israel’s war on Gaza. Israel is a close ally of the US and has substantial political influence and lobbying power within the US legislature.
The growing opposition to South Africa in the US House of Representatives was particularly concerning given that AGOA is a congressional Act and is amended and renewed by the House of Representatives. This increased the likelihood of South Africa being excluded compared to if the programme was overseen by the US federal government. Accordingly, Tau’s comments will be welcomed and indicate an easing of hostility towards South Africa by this legislative body.
Notably, this shift is likely due to three factors. First and foremost, the successful lobbying by South Africa’s government and private sector. Secondly, a fundamental shift in global attitudes towards Israel’s actions in Gaza with SA’s ICJ case notably being supported by US allies such as Spain, leading to the increased US circumspection about appearing to take punitive action against South Africa. Finally, South Africa’s new Government of National Unity (GNU) coalition is expected to portend a more balanced foreign and trade policy.
Accordingly, the impending review is not expected to result in a fundamental shift in US-South Africa relations over the medium term. This is partly due to the fact that US President Joe Biden and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken are opposed to any such action. Biden and Blinken are aware that South Africa is an essential partner for the US in Africa and the developing world. South Africa. Further, while South Africa is a major beneficiary of programmes such as AGOA, the US also benefits economically from its relationship with South Africa. South Africa is an important provider of strategic resources such as platinum and palladium.
However, despite the ongoing efforts to calm friction between the US and South Africa, tensions remain in the relationship. Such tensions are expected to continue given South Africa’s continued close ties with BRICS partners such as Russia and China and its continued ICJ against Israel. The Israeli government will also continue to lobby against South Africa in the US aggravating this friction.
These persistent tensions should be of concern to South Africa’s government and private sector given the unpredictability of US politics. The US is holding its presidential and legislative elections on 5 November and the outcome could lead to fundamental policy and paradigm shifts within both the federal government and legislature. If opposition leader former president Donald Trump regains the presidency, the US could adopt a more revanchist and absolutist approach to foreign policy. This, in turn, would limit the US’s tolerance for South Africa’s own foreign policy positions and could result in a deterioration in US-South African diplomatic and trade relations.
Alert 188 – Ramaphosa announces long-awaited coalition cabinet
President Cyril Ramaphosa, on 30 June, announced his new cabinet almost five weeks after the 29 May general election. This new executive is the result of extended negotiations after the African National Congress (ANC) lost its ruling majority and Ramaphosa was forced to secure a coalition agreement in order to form a government. The President opted for what he calls a government of national unity (GNU) but what is in reality a multi-party coalition. The GNU consists of ten parliamentary parties representing over 70% of the seats in the National Assembly.
Ramaphosa’s new cabinet is reflective of this bulky coalition and is the largest cabinet and executive team in South Africa’s history. There are now 32 ministers and 43 deputy ministers bringing the entire executive team to 77, with the inclusion of the President and the Deputy President. Although the President claims that this was necessary to accommodate the exigencies of the GNU and its members, it is really the result of Ramaphosa’s need to satisfy power brokers and concerned parties within the ANC. Exemplifying this, the President created two additional ministries, and eleven departments will now have two deputy ministers. The ANC also controls 20 of the 32 ministries (62.5%) despite securing only 40% of the seats in the National Assembly.
Notably, of the ten parties that have signed onto the GNU, only six received ministerial posts and will be in the cabinet, while two other erstwhile opposition parties have received deputy minister positions. (A full breakdown of the cabinet is included below this alert).
Ramaphosa has also ensured that the ANC retained control over the country’s primary economic portfolios including Finance, Trade and Industry, Energy, and Mineral Resources. The Democratic Alliance (DA) secured deputy ministerial positions in some of these portfolios, but the message is clear that the ANC will continue to oversee economic policy. This move will likely be welcomed by investors and currency markets as it indicates policy stability. Affirming this, Enoch Godongwana has been reappointed as finance minister and the even-keeled former mayor of Johannesburg Parks Tau has been appointed as the new Minister of Trade, Industry, and Cooperation. Importantly, Ramaphosa has reassigned energy policy to a newly formed Electricity and Energy Ministry bringing responsibility for South Africa’s energy challenges under the sole mandate of Electricity and Energy Minister Kgosientsho Ramokgopa. This strengthens Ramokgopa’s hand and will simplify the bureaucracy and power struggles that have undermined South Africa’s response to the energy crisis.
The DA will be satisfied with the cabinet positions it secured. The party will have some influence in the economic cluster via its deputy ministers and the party has ministerial positions in key frontline departments. These include the Agriculture; Basic Education; Communications and Digital Technologies; Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment; Home Affairs; and Public Works and Infrastructure departments. This will enable the DA to implement practical policy and operational changes in these areas that could result in measurable successes on which the party will be able to campaign in future. These are also portfolios that play to the DA’s administrative strengths.
Particular scrutiny will be placed on the DA’s Siviwe Gwarube who is the new Basic Education Minister, new Home Affairs Minister Leon Schreiber, and Public Works and Infrastructure Minister Deon MacPherson. These are key portfolios which have daily impacts on the lives of voters and are central to service delivery challenges in the country.
Similarly, Velenkosini Hlabisa, the leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), has been appointed as the new head of the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA). As such, he has been tasked with overseeing the improvement of local government and service delivery in the country. Arguably more significantly, the IFP has been assigned the Public Service and Administration portfolio, where the presence of a former opposition party presents a unique opportunity for the professionalisation of the civil service and limiting cadre deployment in government.
This new cabinet is a clear success for Ramaphosa. He managed to ensure that the ANC remained the dominant force in government while ensuring a large centrist coalition government with a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. The full nature of these coalition negotiations will become clearer as the various chairpersons of the parliamentary committees are elected. These should be drawn from across the GNU and lead to increased government oversight.
There are persistent concerns about this new government. Firstly, the large and unwieldy size of the executive is a clear obstacle to effective governance. This will increase the public sector wage bill and will lead to the formation of factions and cliques, which is anathema to Ramaphosa’s preferred leadership style of consensus building. Policy implementation and governance will also be dependent on ministers and deputies that originate from different parties being able to work together.
Yet, there is cause for cautious optimism, Ramaphosa’s new cabinet has the potential to make the substantive policy and governance changes desperately needed in South Africa. This new cabinet is much younger than the previous administration and the presence of rival parties within the government will provide voters with a comparative view of governing ability and this competition should fuel a desire for improved performance and increased scrutiny of any mismanagement within the cabinet itself. This early hopefulness appears to be shared by the currency and security markets as both the Rand and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) responded positively to Ramaphosa’s cabinet announcement.
Alert 187 – Government of National Unity to usher in a new era of South African politics
Cyril Ramaphosa is set to be re-inaugurated as president of South Africa on 19 June. The inauguration is taking place after Ramaphosa was re-elected as president by the National Assembly on 14 June despite the African National Congress (ANC) losing its governing majority in the 29 May general election. The ANC only secured 159 seats in the National Assembly, well below the 201 seats required to form a government.
Faced with this prospect the ANC was forced to seek coalition partners. It should be noted that the ANC remains the dominant force in South African politics and was the only party that had a viable path to forming a coalition government in the wake of the election. After widespread speculation about who the ANC would elect to partner with, Ramaphosa announced on 6 June that it would seek to form a government of national unity (GNU) rather than a simple coalition agreement.
The decision to pursue a GNU achieved several objectives. Firstly, such an approach plays to Ramaphosa’s strengths and belief in consensus building; secondly, a GNU will, in theory, reduce political instability, and finally, it allowed Ramaphosa to move forward without needing to address the dispute within the ANC over who was the preferred coalition partner.
The party was split into two factions, one favouring a deal with the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), arguing that such a formation would provide policy and governance stability; while the second faction favoured a tie-up with either the uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MKP) or the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), contending there were greater ideological similarities with these ANC breakaway parties.
Accordingly, the ANC held talks with nearly all the parties represented in the National Assembly but discussions with the DA, MKP, and the IFP dominated these engagements due to these parties’ size on a national and provincial level. As a result of the election, the ANC needed to partner with at least one of either the DA, MKP, or EFF to secure the necessary majority in the National Assembly.
However, discussions with the MKP and EFF quickly collapsed. The MKP – which is headed by former president Jacob Zuma – demanded that any deal required Ramaphosa to resign as president; a demand which the ANC naturally refused to entertain. Regardless, any partnership with the MKP would likely have been unworkable given that party’s antipathy towards the constitution. Similarly, negotiations with EFF failed to progress after that party’s leaders demanded major positions such as the Speaker of the National Assembly and Finance Minister despite securing less than 10% of the vote. The ANC was also unwilling to entertain these demands.
This left the DA as the ANC’s last viable partner with whom to anchor the GNU. The two parties have long-standing policy and personality differences but are at their core centrist organisations. As a result, the two parties, along with the IFP, managed to draw up a Statement of Intent document before the National Assembly was sworn in on 14 June. This document was subsequently signed by the Patriotic Alliance (PA) and the GOOD party, bringing the total number of parties set to participate in the GNU up to five. As evidence of their planned power sharing, the DA supported the ANC’s Thoko Didiza as the new National Assembly Speaker while the ANC backed the DA’s Annelie Lotriet as the deputy speaker.
This intent to cooperate was evidenced during the first sitting of the provincial assemblies in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) where no party secured a meaningful majority and the speaker and deputy speaker positions were divided among the ANC, DA, and IFP. This was most notable in KZN, where three parties formed a coalition along with the National Freedom Party (NFP) and successfully kept the MKP out of power in that province despite it being the largest party in the provincial legislature. The IFP’s Thami Nthuli was elected premier.
Following the swearing-in of parliament, these parties released the GNU statement of intent which revealed that Ramaphosa will appoint cabinet ministers and deputy ministers from all participating parties in the GNU and that any major decision will need to be collectively supported. In addition, the GNU members will hold a strategy session in the coming weeks to develop an agreed policy agenda for the coming term.
The 29 May election was a watershed moment for South African politics. It marked the end of majoritarian rule in the country and ushered in the age of coalitions. Such political formations will now be the norm going forward. This was highlighted by the 13 June creation of the Progressive Caucus – a six-party opposition alliance largely led by the EFF which is expected to also include the MKP.
Accordingly, South Africa is set to be governed by a large centrist majority coalition while the opposition will consist of an alliance of extremist political parties. In addition, the need for the GNU to find a common policy agenda will likely need a simple pragmatic approach to governance and legislation with a heavier emphasis on governance. Notably, the anticipated appointment of cabinet ministers from former opposition parties will also lead to a much heavier emphasis on governance and implementation given that these parties can be judged on the performance of the respective ministries which they control.
The creation of the GNU has been generally favourably received. Illustrative of this, the South African Rand has strengthened by almost 4.5% since Ramaphosa first announced plans for a GNU while the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) has seen similarly strong activity.
However, there remain threats to the viability of the GNU. These includes potential disagreements over the allocations of cabinet positions and securing consensus over a policy agenda. However, the ANC and DA have both invested substantial political capital into this planned coalition government and as such are incentivised to ensure that it works.
Alert 186 – Mozambique: Frelimo elects presidential candidate
The Central Committee of Mozambique’s ruling party, Frelimo, on 5 May, selected Inhambane governor Daniel Chapo as its candidate for the upcoming 9 October general election after an extraordinary meeting that had lasted for three days. Chapo was elected unopposed in the second round of voting after emerging as the clear favourite after he led the first round of voting with 103 votes to 77 for his nearest rival, Frelimo General Secretary Frelimo, Roque Silva. Silva, who resigned after his defeat, was followed by Frelimo parliamentarian Francisco Mucanheia in third place with 46 votes, while the speaker of the Mozambican parliament, Esperança Bias, only picked up three votes.
Chapo is expected to be elected as Mozambique’s next president in October given Frelimo’s dominance over Mozambique’s politics. He is also now the frontrunner to succeed President Filipe Nyusi as party leader when Nyusi’s current term ends in 2027. Notably, Chapo’s election was largely unexpected as he was not considered one of the frontrunners nor among the preferred candidates of the various factions within Frelimo. As such, it appears that he emerged as a compromise candidate – someone who was not seen as overly affiliated or indebted to any particular faction.
Importantly, Chapo is a comparatively young leader. The 47-year-old governor previously worked as a constitutional law lecturer and a journalist before entering public service in 2005. His first significant role in government was as an administrator in Palma district (Cabo Delgado province) to which he was appointed in 2015. Shortly afterwards, he was appointed as the governor of Inhambane province in 2016, a role he has held ever since. The fact that Chapo had no prior experience in Mozambican national politics nor served in the cabinet likely benefited his candidacy. He is viewed as uncontaminated by any of the various political scandals that occurred in recent years, most importantly, he was in no way implicated in the country’s illegal debt scandal. By appointing a relatively unknown figure who has never been implicated in a major scandal, Frelimo will manage to deflect some of the public anger over corruption ahead of the upcoming general election.
Furthermore, Chapo is originally from Sofala province in central Mozambique. Sofala is one of the more electorally competitive provinces in Mozambique. The country’s two largest opposition parties – Renamo and the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM) – both enjoy strong support in the province. Frelimo’s Central Committee is likely hoping that its choice of Chapo as its presidential candidate will help it defend its control of Sofala and other central provinces.
Aside from his ties to Sofala and his comparatively clean political reputation, Chapo is not expected to have a notable impact on Frelimo’s general election strategy. The ruling party has a large and effective electoral machine which will be directed by the party’s Political Commission and Central Committee. Chapo also has not had time to cement the necessary political capital to have such an impact as yet.
Instead, the impact of Chapo’s election will be felt within Frelimo itself. He is assumed to be the next Mozambican president and Frelimo party leader. Accordingly, the centre of power in Frelimo will shift from Nyusi to Chapo in the coming months. Nyusi will be under pressure to resign as party leader after Chapo’s inauguration to prevent the emergence of a power struggle within the party. Nyusi’s predecessor Armando Guebuza faced similar pressure and resigned in 2015 to enable the presidency and party leadership to be unified under Nyusi.
However, Nyusi has a history of wanting to hold onto power. He attempted and failed to lobby the Central Committee to support amending the constitution to allow him to contest a third presidential term. The incumbent president also retains strong influence within the party and, accordingly, it is feasible that he could try to see out the remainder of his tenure as Frelimo leader. If he does, it will lead to a power struggle within the party with Chapo as the (likely) new president seeks to establish himself while Nyusi seeks to continue to govern from Frelimo’s headquarters.
Nyusi will likely lose any such struggle. His failure to convince Frelimo to support him for a third term and his subsequent inability to have any of his preferred candidates selected as the party’s presidential candidate confirms his influence within the ruling party is limited and waning. Accordingly, Nyusi will likely eventually step down as party leader even if he does not do it in January after Chapo’s likely inauguration.
As for Chapo himself, it is currently unclear what kind of leader he will be. Inhambane province has been comparatively well governed during his tenure as governor. Although he has never served in cabinet, he has had more practical governing experience as a sitting provincial governor. However, his low profile and comparatively young age have made him somewhat of an unknown. This will become clearer in the coming months, especially as he builds alliances and allegiances within Frelimo.
Alert 185 – Attack on South African soldiers highlights complexity of SADC’s DRC involvement
On 14 February the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) confirmed that two of its soldiers had been killed in a militant attack on its base in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC’s) North Kivu region earlier that day. The attack was carried out by the M23 rebel group using mortars. M23 is a predominantly ethnic Tutsi anti-government organisation allegedly backed by Rwanda that has undergone a resurgence in strength over the past year. The SANDF soldiers are in the DRC as part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC). This intervention and peacekeeping mission was deployed on 15 December 2023 and is tasked with combatting M23 and other militant groups in order to help stabilise the Eastern DRC.
The current conflict with M23 in North Kivu essentially began in March 2023 when the rebel group renounced the 2013 peace agreement claiming that the Congolese government failed to follow through on its promise to incorporate its fighters into the armed forces. Over the past year, M23 has managed to secure several significant victories in eastern DRC and capture large swathes of territory. These successes led to renewed fears that M23 could repeat its 2012 success of capturing Goma, the capital of the North Kivu region located on the DRC-Rwanda border. In response to this resurgent group, the DRC has dedicated additional military resources to the region and requested assistance from regional allies. This initially resulted in the deployment of the East African Community (EAC) Regional Force (EACRF); however, this force was largely ineffectual and failed to even fully be implemented before aborting its mission at the end of 2023. As a result, increased focus has turned to SAMIDRC as the predominant peacekeeping force in the area.
SAMIDRC is expected to comprise around 5 000 military personnel from SADC member states of which 2 900 will be provided by the SANDF at a cost of R2 billion (US$105.51 million). South Africa’s involvement in the mission was already controversial given the high price tag but has become even more so following the soldiers’ deaths. The state has been criticised for sending the SANDF contingent to the DRC during a time when the military is under-resourced and overstretched. Experts have also questioned whether the 5 000-person mission is even substantial enough to have an impact on the conflict given that the erstwhile 15 000-strong United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) – of which South Africa was a contributing member –struggled to stabilise the region.
This is particularly concerning given that the M23 rebel group is well-armed and trained. UN experts believe that these high-end weapons and training have been provided by the Rwandan military – a claim that Kigali denies. As such, M23 is a much more capable enemy than the SANDF has faced in recent years, including the Islamic State (IS)-aligned Ahlu Sunnah wa Jama’ah (ASWJ) Islamist militant group which the SANDF is still fighting in Mozambique’s northern Cabo Delgado province. Or even the peacekeeping mission in the DRC prior to 2023 under MONUSCO. As such, it is likely that the SANDF will incur further fatalities in the coming months. Such casualties are particularly likely given that the SANDF is chronically underfunded and lacks the resources to maintain its current domestic and international deployments and the necessary equipment maintenance schedules.
Rwanda’s alleged support for the M23 also means that SADC – particularly South Africa – is essentially entering a proxy war with Rwanda. This has the capacity to further complicate both the situation in North Kivu as well as South Africa’s already tense relationship with Rwanda. Kigali has proven willing and capable of conducting intelligence operations and even assassinations targeting Rwandan dissidents in South Africa in the past. The SANDF’s leading role in SAMIDRC could further antagonise Rwanda into carrying out further such operations.
The security situation in North Kivu is a highly complex one. M23 is one of several armed militant groups operating in the area, albeit the one currently presenting the most significant threat. However, the Islamic-state affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) is also notably active in the area. As such, SAMIDRC marks a second front between the SANDF and an IS-aligned group. The SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), of which the SANDF is again the leading contributor, is only set to conclude in July. Accordingly, South Africa’s military deployments are a challenge to the transnational terrorist organisation and have increased the threat posed by IS to the country. Further, Rwanda’s widely suspected support for M23 has escalated tensions between Rwanda and the DRC leading to isolated clashes along the two countries’ shared border. These tensions threaten to boil over into a more direct conflict which could easily embroil SAMIDRC forces, which would be further complicated by the presence of the Rwanda Defence Force’s (RDF) presence in Mozambique combatting ASWJ.
Yet, despite this complex situation and the SANDF’s clear lack of sufficient resources or funding, South Africa is taking a leading role in SAMIDRC. This is due to the country’s clear economic and geopolitical interests in the DRC. The DRC’s vast natural and mineral resources have long made the country a central actor in African geopolitics while its geopolitical position at the heart of Africa bordering nine other states makes it an important player in African international relations. This was a motivating factor in South Africa’s push to admit the DRC to SADC in 1998. South Africa has benefitted from this close relationship with the DRC and is currently the second largest importer to the country, providing 15% of all its imports.
As the situation in the Eastern DRC persists and becomes even more complicated, there is a real concern that SAMIDRC may not be equal to the task at hand. The 5 000-person force likely lacks the numbers and resources to effectively defeat the (allegedly) Rwandan-backed M23. The anticipated loss of SANDF soldiers in combat combined with the high cost of maintaining this deployment will be politically unpopular in states contributing to SAMIDRC, especially South Africa which is experiencing its own fiscal and security challenges.