Alert 193 – Regional: A watershed year in Southern Africa

Southern Africa underwent a significant political shift in 2024 that could be seen as the beginning of the end of liberation party rule in the region. The year was marked by key elections in states such as South Africa, Botswana, and Mozambique, all three of which delivered historic outcomes in profoundly different ways.

South Africa held its general election on 29 May and saw the ruling African National Congress (ANC) lose its majority for the first time since the advent of democracy in the country in 2024. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa successfully cobbled together a large ten-party centrist coalition referred to as the Government of National Unity (GNU). This coalition is underpinned by the ANC, the centre-right Democratic Alliance (DA), and the Zulu nationalist Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). As a result, multiple parties now have members with cabinet positions which has substantially weakened the ANC’s control of the government and shifted power more effectively away from the party’s headquarters to the presidency and the legislature.

The ANC’s poor performance in the 29 May general election in which it only scored 39.76% of the national vote, marked the end of the party’s ability to campaign as South Africa’s liberation party. After 30 years, the majority of South African voters are now more likely to be mobilised by economic or ethno-nationalist issues than a sense of party loyalty.

This shift was even more evident in Botswana which held its election on 30 October. Batswana voters ousted the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), which had governed the country ever since its independence in 1966 and instead elected Botswana’s erstwhile opposition coalition, the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC). Due to Botswana’s constituency system, the UDC managed to win 36 out of 60 parliamentary seats despite only winning 37.22% of the popular vote. However, this was the single largest share of the vote, and it confirms that the UDC had widespread appeal across Botswana.

The BDP’s jettisoning was particularly remarkable given that the party had governed comparatively well. Botswana is frequently held up as an example of good governance in southern Africa. However, recent poor economic growth and high unemployment were sufficient for voters to decisively break from southern Africa’s longest-ruling political party.

In contrast to the peaceful transfer of power in Botswana, Mozambique’s 9 October general election has been followed by prolonged unrest. Opposition supporters have been staging repeated waves of protests alleging that the general election was stolen. These allegations are supported by independent observer missions noting widespread irregularities, including the unjustified amending of voter tabulation sheets at voting stations. Parallel vote counts also indicate that the Mozambican electoral commission’s (CNE’s) claim that the ruling party FRELIMO won 70.67% is highly improbable. The country’s apex court, the Constitutional Council, is expected to declare the final results on 23 December, but it is widely expected to uphold FRELIMO’s victory albeit with minor adjustments to the scale of the ruling party’s victory.

The fact that the opposition-led protests have been sustained for over two months underscores the deep-seated resentment towards FRELIMO and the widespread frustration with the government in Mozambique. It is unlikely that the true result of the Mozambican election will ever be known, but it is clear that the official result belies a large shift away from FRELIMO.

Mozambique’s election was also noteworthy as the long-time official opposition, RENAMO, witnessed a near-total collapse in its support. Nearly all opposition voters shifted their allegiance to the independent candidate, Venancio Mondlane, and the PODEMOS party that officially allied with him.

The clear shift in support from RENAMO (and most likely FRELIMO) to Mondlane and PODEMOS confirmed that Mozambican voters – similar to those in Botswana and South Africa – were frustrated with the status quo and desirous of change.

Even typically stable Namibia had a more contentious election than usual even if SWAPO managed to retain its strong parliamentary majority. Namibia’s election was marred by allegations of irregularities and malfeasance. SWAPO was helped by the absence of a strong and unified opposition in Namibia. However, new Namibian president Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah – Southern Africa’s first woman president – is under pressure to deliver on electoral promises or risk losing power in 2029.

Southern Africa has clear regional challenges that are present across all countries in the region. The foremost of these are unemployment, poverty, and sluggish and unequal economic growth. Resentment over unequal and inadequate development has historically been contained through increased social spending, a patronage system, and, significantly, an entrenched loyalty among voters to the incumbent former liberation parties. Developments in 2024 have illustrated that this is rapidly shifting, and the region could see more profound political shifts in the coming years. In particular, the Angola election in 2027 will receive particular scrutiny given the similar dynamics at play.

Looking ahead to 2025

The upcoming year is expected to be calmer than the past one. There are no major national elections in the region in 2025. However, the recent political shift could potentially change regional dynamics. The fact that the ANC is now part of a larger coalition will cause the government to be more cautious in its foreign policy. This will be especially true regarding its past unfettered support for fellow liberation parties such as FRELIMO and Zimbabwe’s Zanu-PF. Similarly, the UDC and new Botswana President Duma Boko do not have the same affinity and historical ties to these neighbouring ruling parties. As such, regional patience for poor governance and undemocratic practices by these parties will be more limited, especially given growing frustration over illegal migration in the region, particularly from Zimbabwe and Mozambique.

The upcoming year will also be marked by an increased focus on domestic issues as governments seek to address the regional unemployment crisis and slow economic growth. Governments unnerved by the 2024 electoral pivot against incumbents will seek to take steps to improve service delivery or at least increase social spending in order to retain the loyalty of voters no longer enamoured by liberation credentials.