Alert 192 – Post-election unrest expected to persist

Opposition leader Venancio Mondlane, on 11 November, called on his supporters to stage a fourth round of anti-government demonstrations protesting the 9 October election results. These latest demonstrations started on 13 November and have been well-attended, underscoring the opposition protest campaign’s sustained support. Mozambique has seen widespread unrest since the 9 October general election which opposition leaders and parties claim was rigged. These have intensified ever since the National Electoral Commission (CNE) declared the interim results on 24 October, handing the ruling party, Frelimo, an improbably strong victory. It is estimated that as many as 50 people have been killed in violence related to the unrest thus far and the Mozambican Confederation of Business Associations (CTA) believes that related damage and disruptions have cost the economy over US$388 million.

The 9 October elections were likely marred by fraud. Independent and foreign observers noted widespread irregularities including electoral officials making unjustified changes to the final vote tabulation sheets at both polling station and district levels. Although Frelimo is the largest political party in the country, the CNE’s finding that the Frelimo presidential candidate, Daniel Chapo, won over 70% of the vote and that the ruling party secured majorities over 59% in all ten provinces, is improbable.

Political sentiment became particularly elevated after Mondlane’s lawyer, Elvino Dias, was murdered in a suspected assassination on 18 October. Dias was expected to lead legal challenges to the election results on behalf of Mondlane and the Podemos opposition party. Mondlane and his supporters blame Mozambique’s security forces for Dias’s death which has aggravated opposition antipathy towards the government and the security services.

Mozambique’s apex court, the Constitutional Council, is currently assessing the interim election results and the opposition’s disputes. The court has demanded that the CNE provide justification for the amended vote tabulation sheets and submit the original vote station result sheets. The Constitutional Council is only expected to pronounce the final election results in December and the ongoing protests are party aimed at pressuring the court not to uphold the interim results.

It is likely that the Constitutional Council will amend the electoral results to reduce the scale of Frelimo’s victory. The court took similar measures after Mozambique’s October 2023 municipal elections which were also marred by widespread irregularities. In that instance, the court overturned the results in four municipalities and ordered re-elections in four others. However, it did not reverse the result of the Maputo election even though a parallel tabulation by the independent watchdog, the Public Integrity Centre (PIC), found that the opposition had won that election.

At most, the Constitutional Council will revise the results to ensure that opposition parties, specifically Podemos, have a larger presence in Mozambique’s legislature, the Assembly of the Republic, and could even reveal that the opposition actually won a majority in one or two provinces. It is possible that this may be sufficient to pacify enough opposition leaders and supporters, to take the momentum out of Mondlane’s protest campaign.

In the meantime, the opposition-led protests are expected to continue, which risks worsening Mozambique’s political stability and security environment. Mondlane has sought to direct these demonstrations at Mozambique’s economic pressure points, specifically calling for protests in provincial capitals, near Mozambique’s ports, and encouraging protestors to shut down operations at Mozambique’s border crossings with South Africa.

Such protests have caused substantial disruptions to Mozambique’s logistics networks and cross-border trade. The Lebombo and the Komatiepoort-Ressano Garcia border crossings have been repeatedly closed over the past three weeks and are expected to be targeted by future rounds of demonstrations. On 6 November, Maputo Port was forced to suspend accepting cargo deliveries due to the protests leading to major disruptions at the country’s ports.

There are concerns that the situation could escalate further in the coming days. The government has already deployed the Mozambican military to disperse protests. These soldiers as well as riot police have been accused of using live ammunition to disperse demonstrations, resulting in a high number of casualties. However, the government has adopted a more aggressive rhetoric in its statements denouncing the protests seeking to portray the opposition as a threat to the state itself. A Frelimo spokesperson claimed on state television on 7 November that the protest leaders were fomenting an insurrection and attempting a coup d’état. The use of such language alongside a military deployment is laying the ground for the government to order a stronger crackdown on the protests.

However, the latest round of demonstrations indicates that this threat has not deterred opposition demonstrators. Protests have continued in Mozambique’s major urban areas, especially the cities of Maputo, Nampula, Beira, and Quelimane. As of 14 November, it is estimated that at least 50 demonstrators have been killed, dozens injured, and over 200 more arrested. Yet this has done little to weaken the protest campaign. The fact that the demonstrations are continuing underscores the depth of the popular discontent in Mozambique’s urban areas, especially among the youth. High levels of unemployment, poverty, and the perception of widespread corruption within the state have fuelled frustration with Frelimo and led to the rise of perceived political outsiders such as Mondlane and Podemos.

Any major crackdown by Mozambique’s security forces will risk escalating the violent unrest in the country. The situation in Mozambique is expected to remain volatile for the remainder of November at least. As a result, normal commercial and economic operations in major urban areas will face continued disruptions and security threats.

Much now depends on the Constitutional Council’s verdict on the final election results. If the opposition refuses to accept this finding it will likely catalyse a deterioration in stability, especially as the security establishment will consider a finding in Frelimo’s favour as a justification to crack down on demonstrators more aggressively.