Alert 185 – Attack on South African soldiers highlights complexity of SADC’s DRC involvement

On 14 February the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) confirmed that two of its soldiers had been killed in a militant attack on its base in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC’s) North Kivu region earlier that day. The attack was carried out by the M23 rebel group using mortars. M23 is a predominantly ethnic Tutsi anti-government organisation allegedly backed by Rwanda that has undergone a resurgence in strength over the past year. The SANDF soldiers are in the DRC as part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC). This intervention and peacekeeping mission was deployed on 15 December 2023 and is tasked with combatting M23 and other militant groups in order to help stabilise the Eastern DRC.

The current conflict with M23 in North Kivu essentially began in March 2023 when the rebel group renounced the 2013 peace agreement claiming that the Congolese government failed to follow through on its promise to incorporate its fighters into the armed forces. Over the past year, M23 has managed to secure several significant victories in eastern DRC and capture large swathes of territory. These successes led to renewed fears that M23 could repeat its 2012 success of capturing Goma, the capital of the North Kivu region located on the DRC-Rwanda border. In response to this resurgent group, the DRC has dedicated additional military resources to the region and requested assistance from regional allies. This initially resulted in the deployment of the East African Community (EAC) Regional Force (EACRF); however, this force was largely ineffectual and failed to even fully be implemented before aborting its mission at the end of 2023. As a result, increased focus has turned to SAMIDRC as the predominant peacekeeping force in the area.

SAMIDRC is expected to comprise around 5 000 military personnel from SADC member states of which 2 900 will be provided by the SANDF at a cost of R2 billion (US$105.51 million). South Africa’s involvement in the mission was already controversial given the high price tag but has become even more so following the soldiers’ deaths. The state has been criticised for sending the SANDF contingent to the DRC during a time when the military is under-resourced and overstretched. Experts have also questioned whether the 5 000-person mission is even substantial enough to have an impact on the conflict given that the erstwhile 15 000-strong United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) – of which South Africa was a contributing member –struggled to stabilise the region.

This is particularly concerning given that the M23 rebel group is well-armed and trained. UN experts believe that these high-end weapons and training have been provided by the Rwandan military – a claim that Kigali denies. As such, M23 is a much more capable enemy than the SANDF has faced in recent years, including the Islamic State (IS)-aligned Ahlu Sunnah wa Jama’ah (ASWJ) Islamist militant group which the SANDF is still fighting in Mozambique’s northern Cabo Delgado province. Or even the peacekeeping mission in the DRC prior to 2023 under MONUSCO. As such, it is likely that the SANDF will incur further fatalities in the coming months. Such casualties are particularly likely given that the SANDF is chronically underfunded and lacks the resources to maintain its current domestic and international deployments and the necessary equipment maintenance schedules.

Rwanda’s alleged support for the M23 also means that SADC – particularly South Africa – is essentially entering a proxy war with Rwanda. This has the capacity to further complicate both the situation in North Kivu as well as South Africa’s already tense relationship with Rwanda. Kigali has proven willing and capable of conducting intelligence operations and even assassinations targeting Rwandan dissidents in South Africa in the past. The SANDF’s leading role in SAMIDRC could further antagonise Rwanda into carrying out further such operations.

The security situation in North Kivu is a highly complex one. M23 is one of several armed militant groups operating in the area, albeit the one currently presenting the most significant threat. However, the Islamic-state affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) is also notably active in the area. As such, SAMIDRC marks a second front between the SANDF and an IS-aligned group. The SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), of which the SANDF is again the leading contributor, is only set to conclude in July. Accordingly, South Africa’s military deployments are a challenge to the transnational terrorist organisation and have increased the threat posed by IS to the country. Further, Rwanda’s widely suspected support for M23 has escalated tensions between Rwanda and the DRC leading to isolated clashes along the two countries’ shared border. These tensions threaten to boil over into a more direct conflict which could easily embroil SAMIDRC forces, which would be further complicated by the presence of the Rwanda Defence Force’s (RDF) presence in Mozambique combatting ASWJ.

Yet, despite this complex situation and the SANDF’s clear lack of sufficient resources or funding, South Africa is taking a leading role in SAMIDRC. This is due to the country’s clear economic and geopolitical interests in the DRC. The DRC’s vast natural and mineral resources have long made the country a central actor in African geopolitics while its geopolitical position at the heart of Africa bordering nine other states makes it an important player in African international relations. This was a motivating factor in South Africa’s push to admit the DRC to SADC in 1998. South Africa has benefitted from this close relationship with the DRC and is currently the second largest importer to the country, providing 15% of all its imports.

As the situation in the Eastern DRC persists and becomes even more complicated, there is a real concern that SAMIDRC may not be equal to the task at hand. The 5 000-person force likely lacks the numbers and resources to effectively defeat the (allegedly) Rwandan-backed M23. The anticipated loss of SANDF soldiers in combat combined with the high cost of maintaining this deployment will be politically unpopular in states contributing to SAMIDRC, especially South Africa which is experiencing its own fiscal and security challenges.