Alert 179 – South Africa hosts BRICS Summit under foreign policy scrutiny

South Africa will host the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) 15^th heads of state and government summit in Johannesburg’s Sandton area from 22 to 24 August. The conference will take place in a climate of heightened security and global political tensions which will likely increase unwanted scrutiny of South Africa’s foreign policy.

The build-up to the BRICS summit has been marked by controversy and geopolitical tensions, primarily over whether Russian President Vladimir Putin would attend the event. Putin is subject to an International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant for war crimes committed during Russia’s ongoing war on Ukraine. As a ratified ICC member, South Africa would be obligated to carry out this warrant should Putin arrive in the country. It was finally confirmed on 19 July that Putin would not attend the summit and would send Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in his stead while attending heads of state and government meetings via a remote link. Regardless, the speculation about whether South Africa would comply with the ICC warrant raised concerns over a possible constitutional crisis in the country should the state refuse to do so while upping scrutiny ofits foreign policy, especially its Russia policy and its stance on the Ukrainian war.

The summit also coincides with growing tensions between the United States (US) and China. The world’s two largest economies are currently involved in a trade war over strategic goods such as high-end microchips. This has exacerbated other issues such as security tensions in the South China Sea and Taiwan’s territorial sovereignty. China has long sought to develop BRICS as an economic and diplomatic counterweight to Western powers.

As a result of China and Russia’s ongoing animosity to the United States (US), the two countries are expected to push BRICS to take a more critical tone toward the West at this summit. This will likely include a critique of the fact that Putin was pressured into not coming due to the ICC warrant, allegations of neo-colonialism by the West, and veiled references to the US’s policy of containment towards China. South Africa will likely be decisive in setting this tone as Brazil and India have much more independently-minded foreign policies with more complex and equitable relations with China, Russia, and the US. India notably, has an ongoing border dispute with China and is a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue alongside the US and key US allies Japan and Australia. As such, South Africa’s role could be decisive in whether or not the conference adopts an anti-Western outlook.

Notably, the official agenda of the heads of state and government discussions has not been publicised. However, the summit is expected to address several key issues, most notably:

• Increased cooperation within the bloc.
• The development of a BRICS currency and the advancement of the New Development Bank (NDB).
• Admittance of new members to the bloc.

This last point is particularly significant and is expected to be the topic of much debate. China and Russia are strong advocates of expanding the organisation. The former because it views BRICS as a mechanism by which to expand its global influence away from rivals such as the US, and the latter because it views BRICS’ expansion as a means of circumnavigating the diplomatic and economic isolation resulting from the invasion of Ukraine.

India is undecided on the matter and Brazil is believed to be opposed to expansion as it believes that expanding BRICS would fundamentally transform the group, undermine its cohesion, and limit its value. Brazil is also likely concerned that expansion would reduce some of its own influence within BRICS. This is a valid point as the key value of BRICS is that it comprises a single regional power from five geopolitical spheres.

As such, South Africa’s role could, again, be decisive and has indicated that it would support BRICS’ expansion, likely electing to follow China’s lead on this matter. However, expansion may not be in South Africa’s best interest. Any new members would almost definitely have a larger economy than South Africa and greater diplomatic reach as well. As such, South Africa would be further relegated to a junior member bloc and see its influence diminished. This would especially be the case were another influential African state were to join, such as Ethiopia or Egypt, as this would strip South Africa of its key value proposition to the group as the African representative.

It is believed that over 40 countries have expressed interest in joining BRICS, presenting the bloc with the challenge of potentially expanding while maintaining the exclusivity which has made membership valuable and without insulting other states. Brazil’s concerns that any expansion would fundamentally change the bloc’s nature and dynamics are likely valid, but this could lead to BRICS rivalling the G8 or even G20 as an institution.Highlighting the organisation’s significance, an estimated 67 heads of state are expected to attend the summit as observers, guests, and participant’s in the bilateral meetings on the summit’s sidelines.

It is evident that this could be among the most significant BRICS summits yet, especially if the decision to expand or transform the group is taken. As such, it presents South Africa with an opportunity to highlight its outsized diplomatic importance given that the country is the host. However, this comes with increased scrutiny of itself and its policy and the country is under pressure to ensure the summit concludes without incident. This includes ensuring that the area around the summit is secure and that electricity security at the summit is absolute. The implementation of severe loadshedding in Johannesburg during the summit would be deeply embarrassing for the state.

More importantly, South Africa is undergoing a period of increased diplomatic scrutiny and growing frustration over its non-aligned foreign policy. China, Russia, the US, and the European Union (EU), have all indicated a desire for the country to be more forthright in its foreign policy positions. The US has been most vocal, and indicated that it may consider ejecting the country from preferential trade regimes if it views South Africa as pursuing a foreign policy that is counter to US interests. The most significant of these is the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) which is worth an estimated R6 billion in preferential access to the US market.

In an effort to fend off this external pressure, South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa delivered a foreign policy address on 20 August ahead of the BRICS summit. He reiterated the country’s policy of non-alignment and sought to highlight its active role in multilateralism, noting that this year it is not just hosting the BRICS summit but also the AGOA Forum and the European Union-South Africa Summit in the coming months. This effort to project all sides of South Africa’s universal affability will only succeed if the country manages to display this non-alignment in practice during the BRICS summit. South Africa will need to adopt a similar muscular diplomatic independence as displayed by India and Brazil because, if the country is viewed as overly compliant with Russia or China’s positions, it could endanger the economically essential partnerships it has with the US and EU.

President Ramaphosa initially made his name for himself in politics as a deft negotiator, he will need to again prove this in the coming days for South Africa to successfully navigate the summit and emerge with an enhanced global reputation rather than a diminished one.